# Corruption Risk Assessment for Suriname

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Inception Report



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## ACRONYMS

CRA	Corruption Risk Assessment
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GOS	The Government of Suriname
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
REDD+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
R-PP	Readiness Preparation Proposals
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNCAC	UN Convention Against Corruption
UNDP	United Nations Development Program

## 1. INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Background

Corruption is defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. The word can cover a whole range of abuses. Corruption hinders development prospects and economic growth, affects the country disproportionately, contributes to increased instability and fragility, and negatively impacts reputation. Corruption is recognized as a major bottleneck to a country's development<sup>1</sup>. Corruption manifests itself in different sectors, which represents an obstacle for people to access basic services and undermines human development. The global context of corruption is complex and presents both opportunities and immense challenges. Corruption affects all aspects of organized society and endangers individual rights and freedom—from hindering rule of law, to damaging peace and security, to slowling sustainable development<sup>2</sup>. Recognizing the detrimental impact of corruption on sustainable development and in an effort to address the growing scourge, countries signed up to the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), the first international legal instrument against corruption that came into force in 2005.

Despite the significant progress made globally in recent years, corruption continues to impede development and undermine democracy and rule of law. Evidence indicates that more money is lost due to corruption than ever before. For instance, a UNDP-commissioned study on illicit financial flows (2010) shows that illicit financial flows from the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) increased from \$9.7 billion in 1990 to \$26.3 billion in 2008. Increasing levels of corruption are reinforcing the vicious cycle of corruption and inequality<sup>3</sup>.

At present, the richest 1% of the people own about 43% of the world's wealth and the bottom 80 percent share only 6% of the wealth. With income inequality widening within countries and globally<sup>4</sup>, corruption is also on the rise as the rich abuse their power to maintain or increase their control of resources, and the poor are forced to give in to petty corruption to access services. Similarly, poor governance—including structural weakness, illegal activities, and non-inclusive, non-transparent, or unaccountable political systems—is limiting progress towards reducing inequalities and affecting people's access to services<sup>5</sup>. The Human Rights council also acknowledged that corruption is an enormous obstacle to the realization of all human rights—civil, political, economic, social and cultural, as well as the right to development<sup>6</sup>.

The importance of addressing corruption and promoting transparency and accountability for furthering sustainable development was recognized at several international forums, including the 2010 MDG Summit, the Rio+20 Summit on Sustainable Development<sup>7</sup> and the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel of eminent persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda. Goal 16 of the Sustainable Development

<sup>6</sup> OHCHR, The Human Rights Case Against Corruption at http://www.ohchr.org/

EN/NewsEvents/Pages/HRCaseAgainstCorruption.aspx

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The World Bank Governance Report 2015

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> UNCAC website

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Jong-Sung You and Sanjeev Khagram (2004), *A Comparative Study of Inequality and Corruption*, The Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations and The John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Working Paper No.22 <sup>4</sup> HDRO (2013) *Equity, Inequality and Human Development in a post-2015 framework* HDRO Research Paper

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> UNDP (2010), *The path to achieving the Millennium Development Goals: A synthesis of evidence from around the world*, June 2010. See also the series of global and regional reports prepared for UNDP Democratic Governance Community of Practice Meeting 15-19 February 2012 in Dakar, Senegal.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Others major conferences such as the Istanbul Program of Action (IPoA) of the fourth Conference of the Least Developed Countries (LDC-IV) also stresses on the importance of the fight against corruption for achieving sustainable development.

Goals (SDGs) focuses on peace, justice, and building strong institutions. Fighting corruption is at the heart of Goal 16<sup>8</sup>.

Therefore, the development outcomes depend on the quality of governance. Governance matters for a country's development and good governance is necessary to ensure efficient services to the people, support the development process, increase the efficiency and effectiveness of public investment, and mobilize and regulate private sector resources. Governance in any setting is complex; in a public-sector context, this is even more true. Stakeholders are diverse, the problems to resolve are complex, and policy makers and public sector managers operate in a fishbowl (i.e. they are very much in the public eye and constantly under scrutiny). A government's tolerance and appetite for risks may shift, affecting the nature of those risks in public sector governance, and how that government determines the decision parameters of how to engage in policies, programs, and projects.

Corruption poses significant threats to individual countries as well as to the international community. If corruption permeates the political, economic and social spheres of communities and countries, there can be few prospects for development and prosperity. Corruption often reaches into governments and parliaments, undermining the state and its institutions. Security cannot be guaranteed, development cannot be sustained, and justice cannot reign if there is a widespread public suspicion that institutions are corrupt, and that criminal acts committed by elites go unpunished. Thus, corruption undercuts government legitimacy and undermines the rule of law. A country's political-economic dynamics strongly influence the degree and nature of corruption in that country. The way corruption manifests itself differs from country to country depending upon the ways that people seek and use wealth and power, the strengths or weaknesses of the state, and political and social institutions that sustain and restrain these processes. Differences in these factors give rise to several major syndromes of corruption<sup>9</sup>.

Suriname, a sovereign state on the northeastern Atlantic coast of South America, is composed of various ethnic groups. As the smallest country in South America, Suriname is an upper middle-income country and was one of the Caribbean's best performing economies over the last decade, largely due to its rich endowment in natural resources. The economy grew by 4.5% per year on average between 2004 and 2014, bringing the per capita income to US\$9,300 (Atlas method) in 2015. GDP growth came to a halt in 2015<sup>10</sup>. Suriname's economy is dominated by public sector activities, mining, and services. Gold, aluminum and oil revenues account for roughly 30 percent of GDP and over 90 percent of total exports.

Suriname is not an exception and suffers from deficiencies in a number of aspects of governance affecting that country's economic and social development. Suriname is the most fragmented country (the boundaries of a country and the shape of the land that involves potential and existing problems and/or with political groups that promote rhetoric and actions that are harmful to the country) in the Latin America and Caribbean region and is likely now amongst the 20 most fragmented countries in the world (14 of the 15 most factionalized countries are in Africa)<sup>11</sup>. Suriname scores 74 out of 100 on the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> SDG 2015

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Michael Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> The World Bank Governance Report 2015

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> IDB 2015.

ethnolinguistic fractionalization index cited in Easterly and Levine (1997)<sup>12</sup>. There are challenges in relation to competitive rent seeking by the different groups because of social fragmentation and polarization. Polarization creates incentives for the groups in power to create rents for themselves (through government interventions) at the expense of society at large.

There is limited information about the extent, patterns and actors of corruption in Suriname beyond data provided by the major international governance indicators and indices, and anecdotal evidence. There is a perception that corruption is most pervasive in the areas of government procurement (especially public works), land policy, bribery for services and taxation. There is a widespread perception that the incidence of corrupt acts is rising and there is insufficient debate on anti-corruption initiatives. There are factors such as institutional weaknesses, criminal justice inefficiencies, as well as racial fractures in society that provide fertile grounds for corruption in Suriname. Although there is little data and research available on the country's state of governance and level of corruption, all major governance indicators suggest high and deteriorating levels of perceived corruption in the country and the prevalence of both bureaucratic and political forms of corruption<sup>13</sup>. The scale of the informal and illegal economy is particularly notable, as it breeds criminal activities such as drug and human trafficking or illegal logging which are strongly associated with corruption and coercion.

According to The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), the following table reflects the perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests in Suriname.

2015	2015	2015	2015	2015	2015
Estimate	StdErr	NumSrc	Rank	Lower	Upper
-0.57	0.22	3.00	34.13	16.27	51.67

 Table 1 : Control of Corruption<sup>14</sup>

Note: Estimate: Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance) Rank: Percentile rank among all countries (ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) rank)

While a series of laws such as the *Forest Management Act, Criminal Code (Government Gazette 1911 no. 1, as lastly amended by Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2006 no. 42), Mining Decree*, etc. have been established. There are some provisions to tackle corruption along with related institutions, challenges remain due to major implementation challenges like lack of capacity, resources and trained staff. There is also little evidence of strong political will to effectively tackle corruption. The country has not seen significant support and cooperation in governance. Suriname has no adequate anti-corruption legislation in place. The Ministry of Justice and Police is in charge of combatting corruption, but such efforts are limited by the lack of anti-corruption laws (FitW, 2015). The only existing legal framework comes from the Penal Code, but this is very outdated and new draft laws are not being discussed in the National Assembly (ICS, 2015). Similarly, the government does not require companies to establish policies or internal controls, heightening the risk of foreign companies becoming involved in corrupt practices (ICS, 2016). There are also no financial disclosure laws for public officials (HRR, 2015).

<sup>13</sup> Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), The World Bank 2015

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> The ethnolinguistic fractionalization index measures the probability that two randomly selected persons from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group. The more groups there are, the higher the index. The more equally distributed the groups, the higher the index. The index was constructed for 66 countries in 1960 by Taylor and Hudson (1972).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), The World Bank 2015.

Officials in regulatory agencies. as well as in public procurement positions, are perceived to have more potential for corruption. Suriname is the 88th least corrupt nation out of 175 countries, according to the 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index reported by Transparency International. Public officials also believe that corruption is more likely to occur to evade taxes and customs duties, and avoid harassment by police or regulatory bodies. All major governance indicators identify corruption as widespread, permeating all sectors of the country and society. The corruption rank in Suriname averaged 82.36 from 2004 until 2015, reaching an all-time high of 100 in 2011 and a record low of 49 in 2004. The corruption rank in Suriname is reported by Transparency International. In the World Bank's *Ease of doing Business* Suriname was ranked at 162.

Corruption is an obstacle for development in Suriname. Corruption stems from a lack of regulation and legal anti-corruption measures: A legal anti-corruption framework has yet to be discussed in the National Assembly. This creates problems as it increases the risks of corruption across all sectors. Suriname is not party to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption but has ratified the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption. The country is not a signatory to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combatting Bribery. Still, opposition parliamentarians and the public have alleged the authorities are failing to investigate corruption cases levelled against the public sector<sup>15</sup>.

Despite the plethora of efforts deployed to combat corruption it remains an endemic problem in Suriname. Generally, anti-corruption polices are promulgated while not adequately operationalized, laws are enacted to promote transparency and public accountability but shy in implementation process, and fundamental regulations and principles that serve as triggers to unlocking the barriers to exposing corruption, such as access to information, whistle blower protection, and asset declaration are some of the examples that are usually not found their way into the statue books yet despite of OAS's recommendations<sup>16</sup>. The same report suggests recommendations for budget, mandates, independence and capacity development to anti-corruption agencies. The general public have limited access to government information and that an Access to Public Information Act is needed<sup>17</sup>.

## **1.2** Corruption and Government Transparency

The Government recognizes the need to generate awareness on acts that constitute corrupt practices and the prevention and detection of such practices. In this respect, the Government has established an Inter-Ministerial Steering Group on anti-corruption<sup>18</sup>. The Steering Group's mandate includes the establishment of an anti-corruption strategy, the implementation of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption and facilitating the establishment of a Bureau for the Prevention of Corruption. In addition, the Government announced that good and transparent governance based on democratic principles is a necessary condition for motivating society to work towards common development goals. The 2011 PEFA

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> DFID website

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>). SURINAME FINAL REPORT MECHANISM FOR FOLLOW-UP ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTER-

AMERICAN CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION: Twenty-fourth Meeting of the Committee of Experts September 8 to 12, 2014 Washington, D.C. page 53 (para 290)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> World Bank report on Governance 2015

(Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability) report highlighted important gaps in the areas of investment, budget planning and execution, financial management, internal controls, and external audit.<sup>19</sup>

While Suriname does not have special anti-corruption legislation in place, the penal code does reference anti-corruption. The current and previous governments each sent draft anti-corruption legislation to the National Assembly however neither draft passed into law. Anti-corruption measures in the penal code are not consistently enforced, and the majority of those prosecuted to date have been civil servants. The existing laws do not prohibit payments to family members of officials or to political parties.

Preventing and combatting corruption requires a comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach. The corruption laws of Suriname are outdated, nonenforced, and the National Assembly has yet to debate updated draft legislation<sup>20</sup>. According to this report, the Attorney General and the Ministry of Justice and Police apparently do not investigate frequent, credible allegations of corruption and there have been no known significant prosecutions for alleged high-level corruption. The government procurement, the award of licenses and concessions, customs, and taxation are the common and frequent areas of corruption according to various reports.

Type of Measure	Possible Foci		
Measures to improve regulatory and institutional framework	<ul> <li>Ability to investigate, prosecute and disrupt those who engage in corruption through ensuring existing or new laws and regulatory framework including agencies and that effective legal powers are in place</li> <li>Law enforcement and regulatory response to corruption</li> <li>Effective legal powers</li> </ul>		
Measures to improve accountability and transparency	<ul> <li>Accountability, transparency, and integrity in key sectors and institutions in both the public and private sectors</li> <li>Awareness of the consequences and reality of corrupt practices</li> <li>Transparency and open up government data</li> <li>Citizen's right to information, asset disclosure, whistle blower law etc.</li> </ul>		
Measures to improve law enforcement	• Capacity building to prosecutors, formal anti-corruption institutions, judges and court officials.		
Measures to prevent corruption	<ul> <li>Effective measures to prevent corruption measures while reducing the incentives and/or the opportunities for corruption</li> <li>Education programmes, publicity campaigns and awareness-raising initiatives intended to change attitudes towards corruption, shift cultural norms and encourage reporting</li> <li>Institutional capacity, providing adequate training and ensuring the effectiveness, autonomy and integrity of the government bodies that implement anti-corruption policy</li> </ul>		

Possible national areas of anti corruption measures are as follows:

## **1.3** Corruption in the Mining and Forestry Sector

The Government of Suriname (GOS) identified Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as the key to further growth of the country and its economy. Currently, the forestry, mining and crude oil industry are the main sectors targeted for large scale investment. The GOS Development Plan for 2012-2016 identifies international partnerships as a particularly important means to help develop the economy. This includes

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability 2011

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Suriname Investment Climate Statement 2015.

both bilateral and multilateral partners, as well as private foreign investors. The economy is dominated by the mining industry, with exports of alumina, gold, and oil accounting for about 85% of exports and 25% of government revenues, making the economy highly vulnerable to mineral price volatility<sup>21</sup>. The government's reliance on revenue from extractive industries reflects Suriname's economic outlook. Hence, the private sector of Suriname considers as a country of licences, and all systems are based on the ad hoc concession of a business licence of one form or another<sup>22</sup>. According to 2013 firm-level survey funded by Compete Caribbean, Suriname's business licensing and permits was 18% out of 100 in terms obstacle<sup>23</sup>.

Given these sector's their key role in the economy, improving transparency is instrumental in moving towards better governance and accountability. There is no economic or industrial policy that has a discriminatory effect on foreign investors or foreign-owned investments, except the oil sector. In this sector, ownership is limited by law to the State Oil Company Suriname (Staatsolie). According to the US State Department, Suriname does not conform with regard to the following government legislation: Record Large Transactions - By law or regulation, banks are required to maintain records of large transactions in currency or other monetary instruments.

On the other hand, illegal activities in the forest sector were much more severe and extensive in the past. and the country experienced uncontrolled harvesting leading to political favoritism and bribery<sup>24</sup>. Though the situation seems improved, but Suriname's rating on the Transparency International's perceived levels of public sector corruption score is 36 out of 100<sup>25</sup>. Suriname's commitment to join the EITI (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives) indicates the challenges towards improving the transparency of revenue streams in the extractive industries. Suriname is in the process to become a candidate country by the end of 2016.

Corruption in this sector may occur across a number of transactions, starting from bribery and cronyism on the level of developing national policy and embezzlement in implementing environmental programs to bribery in issuing permits and licenses and collecting "rents" while enforcing regulations. It can be well organized from top to bottom and linked to organized crime (for example, in mineral, timber and forest resources smuggling is prevalent), and it can be widely represented through a number of governmental agencies and services.

#### **Forestry Laws**

Suriname has 15.3 million hectares of forest covering approximately 94% of the country's surface area. (FAO, 2015). 91.4% of Suriname's forest area is primary forest, 8.5% is naturally regenerated and only 0.1% planted. The Constitution of the Republic of Suriname stipulates that the social goal of the state is to create and stimulate circumstances that are necessary for the protection of nature and maintenance of ecological balance. The Forest Management Act of 1992, sets out rules regarding timber production and export, as well as defining the various licenses for forest harvesting available. The act also takes into

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> The World Bank Foreign Direct Investment Report, 2014

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Private Sector Assessment Report Inter-American Development Bank, 2014

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Compete Caribbean 2013

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Law, Compliance, and Prevention and Control of Illegal Activities in Suriname, Country Assessment Preliminary Version, 2007

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2015

account the interest of forest-dwellers and conservation of biological diversity. Furthermore, it provides rules governing timber production (and, to some extent, timber processing) and export.

## **1.3.1** Corruption Risks in REDD+

It has been observed that "corruption is an important enabler of deforestation in developing countries."<sup>26</sup> Moreover, corruption in the forestry sector breeds more corruption, as the law enforcement and judiciary are similarly compromised.<sup>27</sup> REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation) corruption may take place during what is referred to as the *Readiness Phase* as well, during which national frameworks are designed and corruption may be "legalized."<sup>28</sup> During this phase, "high level actors, such as political elites, institutions, powerful national and international timber companies, industrial scale agribusiness, multinational corporations, project developers and the military... may seek to influence the design of national REDD+ frameworks, legislation and regulations in order to maximize their chances of capturing REDD+ revenues."<sup>29</sup> In general, corruption may inherent in REDD+ at both "grand" and "petty" levels, as well as at levels in between. Some examples have been presented in the following table:

REDD+ in practice may encounter many challenges, in particular including a poor governance. Corruption could be one of the major barriers to an effective REDD+ mechanism. Corruption may occur at all levels of administration (national, district, municipal, local) and in both the design and implementation of REDD+ levels. It could affect land administration, agrarian reform, trade and other sectors. Dealing with corruption risks in the context of REDD+ is crucial to increase the secure commitment from all actors to gain confidence of potential donors and investors and ensure long-term sustainability and financing. In the absence of anti-corruption measures, it could affect in REDD+ program.

At present, there is little discussion of existing governance structures for REDD+ and the importance of designing efficient REDD+ strategies that will explore linkages with other sectors and national economic development. Civil society organizations in Suriname argue that the Government of Suriname has failed to recognize and respect the collective rights of indigenous and tribal peoples in accordance with international obligations<sup>30</sup>. There is a challenge for capacity building and institutional strengthening for forest law enforcement in Suriname which is not prioritised, and does not indicate a commitment to addressing law enforcement issues as part of a REDD+ strategy.

governance/anti-corruption/staying-on-track--tackling-corruption-risks-in-climate-change.html, accessed 11 September 2012. <sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Bofin, P. et al, *Addressing Governance and Corruption Challenges in Schemes for REDD*, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Center U4 Issue 2011:1 (February 2011), p. 10, available at <a href="http://www.u4.no/publications/redd-integrity-addressing-governance-and-corruption-challenges-in-schemes-for-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-redd/">http://www.u4.no/publications/redd-integrity-addressing-governance-and-corruption-challenges-in-schemes-for-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-redd/</a>, accessed 11 September 2012

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Blundell, A. and Harwell E., *Manual: An Analysis of Corruption in the Forestry Sector*, Transparency International (October 2009) available at http://www.illegal-logging.info/uploads/Forestsectorcorruptiontoolsnov09FINAL.pdf, accessed 11 September 2012

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Thorpe, A. and Ogle, L., *Staying On Track: Tackling Corruption Risks in Climate Change*, United Nations Development Programme (January 2011), p. 32, available at <u>http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> GOVERNANCE OF REDD+, Suriname 2010

## 1.4 Civil Society and the Fight against Corruption in Suriname

The Government of Suriname recognizes that for effective governance to take place there is need to engage the civil society in addressing the challenges of implementation of human rights and access to justice principles, as well as anti-corruption initiatives. There are significant numbers of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) involved in advocacy for good governance, and anti-corruption initiatives. The Media as part of the broader civil society is seen as playing a key role in delivering awareness on human rights and access to justice and as an integral and essential part of the democratic process while limited activities have been heard or perceived in anti-corruption programs in Suriname.

The Anti-Corruption Society Suriname, which is a new organization and a division of the Technological University of the Americas is the recent non-government organization engaging in good governance, ethics and integrity to fight against corruption. It aims at raising awareness on good governance and ethics in the whole society as the basis for sustainable development in Suriname. It acts as an anti-corruption watchdog openly denounce and emphasize the role of good governance, ethics, personal integrity and personal responsibility for national development.

Civil society is seen as an increasingly important agent for promoting good governance like transparency, effectiveness, openness, responsiveness and accountability. Civil society can help further and improve good governance through its policy analysis and advocacy in Suriname. In this respect, civic society in Suriname has a long way to go to engage in a pragmatic and country specific roles for a strong enabling environment with the scope for civic movements such as to protest and to sit at the table with governments to dialogue and contribute to anti-corruption policy outcomes

#### 1.5 Private Sector

The four largest private sector institutions in Suriname are the Suriname Business Forum (SBF), the Suriname Trade and Industry Association (VSB), the Manufacturers Association of Suriname (ASFA) and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KKF). The World Bank's Ease of Doing Business Report classes Suriname 64th in the world ranking<sup>31</sup>. This indicates that business sector has a very high risk of corruption when dealing with public procurement and licenses in Suriname. Irregular payments in connection with awarding public contracts and licenses are widespread<sup>32</sup>. A lack of transparency make the procurement system opaque<sup>33</sup>. Anti-Corruption Society Suriname (Hubert Rampersad) states that Suriname is in the grip of corruption, corruption scandals and the society seems permeated by corruption<sup>34</sup> and corruption seems to be an accepted phenomenon which has a negative impact on the investment climate. Further, the government does not encourage or require private companies to establish internal codes of conduct. Private companies don't use internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials<sup>35</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> The World Bank's Doing Business Report 2013

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Investment Climate Statements 2015

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Anti-Corruption Society Suriname (Hubert Rampersad)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Suriname Investment Climate Statement 2015, U.S. Department of State.

Level of corruption	Areas vulnerable to corruption
Grand corruption	Sectoral policy and regulations development
Mid-level corruption	<ul> <li>Distribution of benefits/resources including through public procurement</li> <li>Permitting and certifications—issuing permits and certificates for different utilization of territories and natural resources, and operating of mining/forest sites, land use, and administrative and budgetary support for capacity building</li> </ul>
Petty corruption	• Enforcement (inspections and policing): (1) inspections by enforcement agencies and other related agencies to assess compliances, and (2) enforcement via policing violations such as, for example, poaching, illegal logging, resource trafficking, etc.

Hence, various forms of illegality are prevalent. The governance in these sectors is weak in many countries with corruption. Corruption is likely to happen when administering revenues or while allocating funds for the targeted programs.

	Corruption Risk <sup>36</sup>		
Land Use Planning	• Logging companies influencing the design of land use plans in order to exclude		
	high timber concessions from REDD+;		
	• Project developers, and other such entities with interests in particular land areas		
	ensuring their properties are allocated to or excluded from REDD+		
Policies and Measures	• Collusion to favour certain types of REDD+ activities that favour one sector		
(Strategy Development	• Undue influence to determine who is eligible to conduct REDD+ activities		
Phase) <sup>37</sup>	• Undue influence to create fraudulent licenses, land titles		
	• Fraud to avoid the recognition of informal and customary tenure rights		
	• Lack of transparency allowing cronyism in the appointment of new staff to		
	conduct the readiness process		
Policies and Measures	• Corruption that results in REDD+ safeguards not being adhered to		
(Implementation	• Collusion, extortion, bribery or cronyism in the procurement of goods and		
Phase) <sup>38</sup>	services,		
	• Bribery, cronyism, abuse of discretion, and/or collusion to overlook poor		
	enforcement		
	• Corruption of the judiciary system or other informal or customary complaints		
	resolution system		
Actions Phase <sup>39</sup>	• Undue influence and bribery to ignore breaches of REDD+ laws and regulations		
	• Embezzlement of REDD+ revenues		
	• Fraud related to the distribution of benefits from REDD+ revenues		
Design of Benefit-	• State capture, nepotism and cronyism may influence the design of BDS at		
Distribution Systems	national, provincial and local levels		

To this end, Bofin, et al., summarize the recent literature on possible national anti-corruption measures for  $REDD^{40}$ .

Type of Measure	Possible Foci
Measures to improve	Land use planning processes; allocation process for logging concessions; development
regulatory and	of REDD+ framework (regulations plus institutions); statutory oversight institutions;
institutional framework	framework for broad stakeholder participation (including forest communities, civil

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Guidance on Conducting REDD+ Corruption Risks Assessments (REDD+ CRA), 2012

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Guidance on Conducting REDD+ Corruption Risks Assessments (REDD+ CRA), 2012

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Ibid

<sup>39</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Taconi et al (2009) and Brown (2010) cited in Bofin et al, 14

	society, private sector); formalization of ownership or profit rights from forest uses.		
Measures to improve	Land use planning; creation of REDD+ baseline data; development of REDD+		
accountability and	framework (regulations plus institutions); regulatory framework for forests; allocation		
transparency	process for logging concessions; MRV system for non-carbon benefits (including field		
	based monitoring); demand-side accountability institutions; statutory oversight		
	institutions; data on donor support to REDD projects; data on private sector		
	involvement in REDD projects.		
Measures to improve Capacity building to state prosecutors, formal anti-corruption institutions, judge			
law enforcement court officials.			
Measures to reduce	Reform of national forestry taxation system; addressing rents from land uses that		
rents from	replace forests (e.g. palm plantations).		
deforestation			

## 2. OBJECTIVE OF A CORRUPTION RISK ASSESSMENT (CRA)

#### 2.1 Corruption Risk Assessment (CRA)

In many countries, corruption has been attributed to both "flawed structures in the political economy" and the lure of "economic incentives between principals and agents," both "exacerbated by social and cultural norms."<sup>41</sup> Guidance on Conducting REDD+ Corruption Risks Assessments (REDD+ CRA) provides framework for corruption risk assessments and multi-stakeholder consultations have been acknowledged as possible ways through which corruption risks in REDD+ may be identified and addressed.<sup>42</sup>

In order to be able to combat and prevent corruption effectively in Suriname, it is necessary to know as much as possible about it, such as:

- Where it occurs;
- How it occurs;
- Who is involved;
- Why there is an opportunity for it to occur;
- What the trends are;
- Who is responsible for managing the situation; and
- What mechanisms exist and what institutions are responsible.

There is no standard approach in terms of definitions, methodologies, samples and sources of corruption risk. In order to be able to answer this question as aimed by this assessment, one would require reliable and compatible information on at least three aspects of the corruption: the public and/or specialised groups' perception about how much and which type of corruption exists; secondly, what anti-corruption mechanisms are in use or used; and thirdly, records of reported and processed cases of corruption within the public, private and civil society sectors their roles in preventing and combating corruption in Suriname.

#### 2.2 Assessment Rationale

The need for national-level data on corruption and governance continues to grow to provide in-depth analysis that can inform policy development. Many countries use aggregated indicators such as Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index or the World Bank Governance Indicators to compare and rank countries. These are useful as awareness-raising instruments while their role in policy making is very limited because it simply helps to identify areas for reform. Also, its limited focus on governance and corruption based on a country's unique corruption challenges provides an opportunity for country level assessment addressing all levels and sectors and possible factors that contribute to and facilitate corruption in Suriname, including:

- An incomplete and inadequate legal framework;
- Selective enforcement of existing laws and regulations and the exercise of excessive discretion by public and elected officials at all levels;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Quimson, G. *National Integrity Systems Transparency International Country Study Report of the Philippines*, Transparency International (2006) available at <a href="http://info.worldbank.org/etools/ANTIC/docs/Resources/Country%20Profiles/Philippines/TransparencyInternationa\_NIS\_philippines.pdf">http://info.worldbank.org/etools/ANTIC/docs/Resources/Country%20Profiles/Philippines/TransparencyInternationa\_NIS\_philippines.pdf</a>, accessed 11 September 2012

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Guidance on Conducting REDD+ Corruption Risks Assessments (REDD+ CRA), 2012

- Excessive regulation of the economy by the state;
- Excessive executive control and influence over the judicial branch and the civil service, combined with inadequate oversight of the executive branch;
- Collusive ties between the political and economic elite, where the former use the state to enhance their wealth and the latter use their wealth to enhance their power;
- Low capacity for advocacy in civil society;
- Weak accountability mechanisms within government and in civil society to control potential abuses;
- Uneven public access to information of government decisions and operations;
- Resistance to decentralizing authority and resources to the regional and local levels which could break corruptive networks; and
- High tolerance for corrupt practices among the population and the general belief that corruptive abuses and misconduct for public officials are low risk events and can be conducted with impunity.

In addition, the proposed country level corruption assessment is important to study at various levels of Government, including ministries, the judiciary, parliament and local government for purposes of designing better policies and monitoring progress. Governments may also find study results for responding to demand by donors and businesses. Moreover, study results are useful for civil society, such as political parties, think tanks and NGOs for purposes of advocacy and for holding governments to account.

In this context, based on the objectives of the terms of reference (ToR), it seeks a comprehensive analysis of the state of corruption in Suriname– taking into account the political-economic context that facilitates or inhibits corruption, the legal/regulatory/oversight framework, the constituencies for and against reform, ongoing anti-corruption programs, and entry points for appropriate anti-corruption initiatives.

## 2.3 Objectives of this Study

The proposed assignment intends to perform a comprehensive corruption risk assessment and to make recommendations on measures for integrity/corruption risks mitigation as a business case. In this regard, the CRA is to provide evidence of actual or perceived corruption in a given context and to inform recommendation for anti-corruption strategies and policies or for advocacy purposes. The assessment study can also serve as a baseline for anti-corruption work to track changes in risks over time in Suriname. This assessment report can be applied at all levels from government institutions, to donor support programs, down to sectoral programs, as well as in individual organizations or units.

Specifically, the study aims to achieve the following:

- To offer a comprehensive overview of the phenomenon and nature of corruption in Suriname (including institutional factors that favour or might favour corruption) and the ongoing responses to it.
- To provide an overview of the country's strategies, legislation and policies.
- To provide an overview of the anti-corruption mechanisms as currently in place or envisaged.
- To serve as a baseline to measure the perception of corruption and the progress in preventing and combatting corruption.
- To draw up recommendations on how to eliminate or diminish corruption effects and provide the impetus to engage in a national dialogue about corruption, thereby focussing attention on the issue and creating windows of opportunity to pursue targeted reforms.

The study will cover, but is not limited to, the following:

#### Government sectors and institutions

- Judiciary and law enforcement
- Parliament
- Civil service
- Audit institutions
- Anticorruption agencies
- Elections
- Taxation system
- Private sector
- Other sectors
- Public officials of different entities (including local governments)
- Constitutional agencies
- Geopolitical zones
- Private sector
- Civil societies

#### **Crosscutting issues**

- Budget and financial management
- Public procurement
- Privatization
- Media
- Civil society
- Sectoral policies such as forest and mining concession policies (potential REDD+ options in R-PP).

## 2.4 Study Focus

Keeping in view of the above objective, the study will focus on the following primary question and secondary research questions based on the preliminary analysis of the ToR.

The primary research question is: How well are corruption risks affecting in general and in mining, agriculture, and forestry in Suriname? More specifically:

- Q1: What are the contextual parameters of corrupt practices and anti-corruption initiatives?
- Q2: What anti-corruption interventions have been initiated?
- Q3: What specific corruption risks have they addressed?
- Q4: What has been the approach of the anti-corruption intervention?
- Q5: How have activities tackled the diverse range of factors of the identified corrupt practice or risk?
- Q6: What have been the results of the anti-corruption intervention?
- Q7: What have been the enabling and hindering factors of the anti-corruption intervention's results?

Q8: What sustainability mechanisms were built into the anti-corruption intervention?

The secondary research questions will focus on the impact and control of corruption, as well corruption affecting specific sectors like mining, agriculture, and forestry:

Q1: How does corruption impact on these sectors in Suriname?

Q2: What measures are in place to curb corruption in these sectors?

Q3: What measures are put in place (or planned) to reduce corruption risks?

Q4: What are the views of stakeholders on the gaps, strength and weaknesses of these measures?

Q5: What are their mitigation strategies?

## **3.** CRA FRAMEWORK

This corruption risk assessments aims to help better understand the situational factors that facilitate and inhibit corruption risks, and assist them in prioritizing potential interventions. The following figure presents a process overview of the corruption assessment framework.



#### **Figure 1: Suriname Corruption Risk Assessment Framework**

The above is broken down into two phases:



## 4. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

## 4.1 Approach

Corruption risk may correspond to a set of institutional including sectoral vulnerabilities (for example, forest and mining, and REDD+) within a system or process which might favour or facilitate corrupt practices. Corruption risk may be understood as a factor of the level of transparency and level of fairness in a process, and the difference between the current system and an ideal system.

Therefore, the corruption risk assessment covers from the identification of corruption and/or institutional weaknesses/gaps as an indicator of risk of corruption, to an analysis of the impact and estimation of the likelihood of corrupt practices. Further, risk assessment may include prioritization of risks, identification of tools to address the identified risks, and guidance on the development of anti-corruption strategies. In many cases, the first phase of the process consists of identifying broad risk areas (usually through secondary sources), which are then analyzed in more detail in the second phase (primary sources).

## 4.2 Sources of Information

The assessment will use a combination of secondary sources (legal analysis and research) and primary sources (key informant interviews) for corruption risk assessment. Secondary sources will be used in the preliminary stages to give a picture of the overall governance environment in Suriname, institution and sector, or to identify priority risk areas. Primary sources will be used for deeper analysis of the more critical corruption risks (or perceived risks). In addition, some form of expert analysis will be used to assess the level of risk (e.g. likelihood and probability of corruption).

The following are the main sources:

#### i. Documentary

- Existing reports and studies on the areas under assessment including sectors such as justice, forest mining, etc.
- Relevant legal norms, statutes, internal rules and guidelines
- Relevant procedures and processes

List of potential documents for review has been provided in appendix 1.

#### ii. Interviews

- Relevant officials of the institution concerned, plus, potentially, some group interviews and discussions
- Officials from other institutions as appropriate, e.g. audit, Ombudsman
- Users of the relevant public service/clients of the institution
- Other organisations for example NGOs specialising in areas relevant to the activities of the institution

#### 4.3 CRA Process

The study will employ the following methodological approach in conducting the corruption risk assessment for Suriname:

#### i. Stakeholder mapping

Following agreement on the scope and focus of the assessment with UNDP Suriname, the consultant will conduct stakeholder mapping to identify the institutions and individuals concerned with and affected by corruption, and who have an interest in the study recommendations. The stakeholder mapping will include discussion with people from PMU in relation to REDD+ mapping information which is about to finalize.

#### ii. Formulation of assessment questions

The study will employ questionnaire (of descriptors or indicators on key focus areas and institutions) to ensure that the study investigation remains focused on obtaining data usable for actionable programmatic recommendations relevant to UNDP Suriname.

Questionnaire will be used with a subset of the items with binary answers (e.g. Yes or No or short answer) in order to make it easier to quantify risks. The questionnaire will be more or less identical and formulated consistently to make sure that answers provide appropriate information. Questionnaire is provided in Appendix 2.

The study will be based on both quantitative and qualitative information and data. The research instruments will be both qualitative and quantitative using the approach of stratified random sampling.

Table 2: CRA Methods and Focus				
Stakeholders	Methods	Focus		
Public institution actors including	Questionnaire	Understanding corruption, general perception on		
sectors such as mining and forest,		political, social and economic issues, causes of		
REDD+		corruption, national initiatives, legislation, anti-		
		corruption programme supports, national response		
		to corruption, institutional capacity to fight		
		corruption, anti-corruption institutional		
		arrangements, procurement, employment, codes of		
		conduct.		
Constitutional agencies such as	Questionnaire	Public expenditure management, compliances,		
Audit, Ombudsman		capacity, mandates, etc.		
Private sector	Questionnaire	Public procurement, commercial laws, licensing,		
		business registration, tax, custom, etc.		
Civil society Unions, Professional	Questionnaire	Whistle blowing, hotlines, witness Protection etc.,		
Associations		anti-corruption forum		
Individuals	Questionnaire	Corruption perception, barriers and challenges in		
		public services.		

#### Table below shows the methods and focus of questionnaire in the process of CRA:

#### iii. In-country research

The study will conduct a detailed review and analysis of the literature and surveys concerning corruption in Suriname. The methodologies are designed to obtain both quantitative and qualitative data and include:

- Structured interviews with key informants;
- Informal discussions regarding assessment to back up data and information.

#### iv. Data analysis

Data from these various methodologies will be collated and analyzed. The analysis will examine information from both the literature and data collected to making recommendations in the areas interest in particular capacity development—short, medium, and long term.

#### v. Final report

The ToR envisages two outputs: a) CRA, and b) Final report. The consultant will submit both outputs according to standard structure.

#### 4.4 Stages of CRA

Assessment of corruption risks in Suriname (public institutions) means the process of identification institutional factors that foster or may facilitate corruption, and elaboration of recommendations for prevention of their effects.

The CRA shall be carried out in three stages:

- Assessment of preconditions;
- Assessment of corruption risks per se; and
- Elaboration of recommendations for elimination or reduction of their effects (elaboration of integrity plans).

Table 5. CKA Thases				
Assessment of Prerequisites, Situational analysis/Gap analysis	Assessment of Corruption Risks	Submission of Recommendations		
<ul> <li>Assessment of the legal framework, relevant for the specific institution</li> <li>Assessment of the legal framework (laws and subordinated normative acts, including assessment of provisions covering vulnerable activities)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Investigation and identification of risks</li> <li>Collection of data and information regarding existent and potential risks of corruption within the institution.</li> <li>Methods</li> <li>Assessment of employee's resistance against the corruption risks (selection to job description and supervision etc.)</li> <li>Administration of questionnaire to the employees of the organization</li> <li>Analysis of concrete cases</li> <li>Assessment of the organization's relationship with the public.</li> <li>Techniques for the investigation and identification of pre-existent sources (previous investigation/assessment) by public officials, auditors, courts, parliament, mass media etc.</li> <li>Collection of information from surveys—a questionnaire and verbal interviews, administered to various</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Report on the risks assessment covering:</li> <li>Assessment of pre-conditions</li> <li>Assessment of corruption risks</li> <li>Integrity plan (including institutional strengthening to capacity development)</li> <li>Provision of periodic reassessment</li> </ul>		

Table 3:	CRA	Phases
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Methods         • Mapping of existing anti-corruption laws, frameworks, regulatory policies, institutions         • Gap analysis         Assessment of the organizational structure of the institution         • Analysis of systems, process, functions etc.         • Analysis of flow chart, job descriptions and work processes and procedures	<ul> <li>interest groups</li> <li>Use of target groups to collect detail information regarding visions on the corruption</li> <li>On-site observation</li> <li>Analysis of risks</li> <li>Probability of occurrence</li> <li>Possibility of avoiding identified risks</li> <li>Reducing risks to an acceptable level of potential damage</li> <li>Attention and resources to prioritized risks to manage threats for the institution</li> <li>Risk impact management</li> <li>Prioritization of risk—minor, moderate, and grave</li> <li>Prioritization of risk based on occurrence—high, medium, and low probability.</li> </ul>
Assessment of codes of ethics (code of conduct, deontological code, or other regulations that are guiding the behaviour of employees in the institution)	<ul><li>Review of documents</li><li>Interviews</li></ul>

## 4.5 Sampling

The CRA is designed in line with a probability sample survey based on key informant interviews. The basic objective of probability sampling is to resemble the findings to the entire country.

Stakeholders are organisations, groups or individuals who have a direct or indirect interest in corruption risks in Suriname. The classification of stakeholders with whom the assessment will consult is:

- Officials from public institutions
- Forest and mining sector and REDD+
- Private sector
- Individuals (male and female)
- Civil society

The assessment will take account of key elements of diversity, for example: locations. Sampling is planned within this stratum taking into account of the resources (time) available and relevance for study.

• An indicative objective is to conduct interviews with key informants of public institutions, private sector and civil society.

#### 4.5.1 Sample Frame

Suriname is divided into 10 districts and sub-divided into about 62 Ressorten. According to the 2012 census data, Suriname has a total of **541,638** habitants. Almost half of the population are living in urban

and rural areas Table 4 below shows the distribution of the population by District, and urban and rural areas.

Name	<u>Abbr.</u>	<u>Capital</u>	Area A (km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Population</b> Census (C) <b>1980-07-01</b>	Population Census (Cf) 2004-08-02	Population Census (Cf) 2012-08-13
Brokopondo	BRO	Brokopondo	7,364	6,621	14,215	15,909
Commewijne	COM	Nieuw Amsterdam	2,353	20,063	24,649	31,420
Coronie	COR	Totness	3,902	2,777	2,887	3,391
Marowijne	MAR	Albina	4,627	16,125	16,642	18,294
<u>Nickerie</u>	NIC	Nieuw Nickerie	5,353	32,690	36,639	34,233
Para	PAR	<u>Onverwacht</u>	5,393	12,027	18,749	24,700
<u>Paramaribo</u>	PMR	Paramaribo	182	169,798	242,946	240,924
<u>Saramacca</u>	SAR	<u>Groningen</u>	3,636	10,808	15,980	17,480
<u>Sipaliwini</u>	SIP		130,567	23,226	34,136	37,065
Wanica	WAN	Lelydorp	443	60,725	85,986	118,222
Suriname	SUR	<u>Paramaribo</u>	163,820	354,860	492,829	541,638

**Table 4: Population of Suriname** 

• (1980) The Europa World Year Book 1991.

(2004) (2012) Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek in Suriname (web).

The number of interviews will be proportionate to the population within a country<sup>43</sup>:

Population size	No. of Key Information Interviews Targeted	
< 50000	3	
50000 - 100000	10	
100000 - 500000	15	
> 500000	33	

- **Population:** The assessment survey is designed to collect information from a nationally representative sample of the entire population excluding non-institutionalized adults who are not eligible to participate in the survey.
- Unit of Observation: The study considers individuals not only to the individual, but also to other members of the household. Thus, the statistical unit of observation is the household.

The sample frame is designed based on:

- Population size.
- The study is focused to institutions hence, priority will be given for urban area (capital Paramaribo assuming that all state level institutions are located).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Calculated based on guidelines provided in Draft Handbook on Designing of Household Sample Surveys 2003, UN Statistics Division.

- Minimize travel time in study.
- Optimal allocation that would allow a reasonable set of trade-offs between budget, sample size, and level of precision of the results.
- Use the best and most up-to-date sampling frame available.
- Expectation of 33 at least key informant interviews (but will take more time permitting).
- At least 20 interviews from institutions
- At least 2 interviews from private sector
- At least 6 interviews with women.
- At least 2 interviews from civic society
- At least 4 interviews in rural.

Potential organizations and agencies for data collection has been provided in appendix 3.

## 4.5.2 Data Collection Instrument

The main instrument for data collection is questionnaire. Questionnaire is structured to assess Suriname's knowledge, attitudes, practices and risks relating to corruption and corrupt practices in Suriname.

Questionnaire as the primary data collection method is designed in multiple answers. This will be complimented by short interpersonal interviews for clarification during questionnaire collection.

## 4.5.3 Data Collection Methods

The assessment survey will be conducted through face-to-face interviews with randomly selected key informants. A stratified two-stage sampling method will be used: in the first stage, the total population is stratified by key institutions such as public institutions, private, sectoral, civic society etc. and secondly, geographical regions such as urban and rural (categorized by size of population according to national administrative system and census).

Sample selection is at the discretion of consultant team. While efforts will be made to interview some citizens with little or no connections to power/government as well.

## 4.5.4 Data Analysis

The data for this assessment will be analyzed on MSs Excel and SPSS Platforms. The survey responses will be analyzed and reported using descriptive statistics.

#### 4.6 Triangulation and Validation

Two types of triangulation of information will be carried out. The stakeholders interview information will be corroborated in addition to triangulation of the information obtained with secondary sources. In other words, all findings – from desk study will be cross-checked by comparative analyses and targeted interviews across the assessment and findings from the perspectives of staff, agencies, donors, and experts. To further strengthen the triangulation of data, multiple data sources, including primary and

secondary documentary evidence, and data collected from observations, key informants and stakeholders interviews across an assessment questions will be undertaken.

## 4.6.1 Validation of Findings

Preliminary dissemination of draft findings and inclusive stakeholder comment will be taken through workshop. Secondly, review and comment on the draft report will be the primary means to validate findings prior to finalization.

#### 4.7 Study Results

The results from a comprehensive corruption risk assessment (recommendations- immediate, medium and long term as well as actor specific) aims to assist on measures for promoting integrity and mitigating corruption risks in Suriname.

Secondly, the study will provide a capacity development plan for relevant and interested civil society groups and media, with specific and measurable indicators, all while applying the recommendations to the REDD+ context.

## 5. CORDINATION ARRANGEMENT AND WORKPLAN

## 5.1 Coordination Arrangement

In the First Phase, the consultant will study all relevant documents pertaining to the CRA and this includes as forest decree, anti-corruption institutions, anti corruption programmes, civic society etc. The consultant however will extend the document review to policy documents, relevant reports such as Project Documents of other Development Partners, R-PP, as well as other interesting research and reports, in order to get a thorough understanding of the background. UNDP Suriname and the national consultant will assist in the sourcing of the appropriate materials before or upon arrival in Suriname.

In the Second Phase the consultant will travel to Suriname to conduct the assessment. This Phase will start with an extensive briefing with the national consultant and UNDP. The consultant will present and discuss suggested assessment design and the tools, which will be agreed upon. A work plan will be finalized (e.g. institutions, key informants, experts, etc.) in coordination with the national consultant and UNDP for the entire field program (scheduling of interviews in particular) at the end of the first day, during which the team will have a (first) meeting/interview with the PMU, UNDP.

The assessment seeks to conduct interviews in the capital, Paramaribo as it seems all stakeholders are located. However, couple of field visits are expected to districts and ressorten (considered rural) that are close by depending upon time availability. In case if it is not possible to travel to districts, the team (consultants) will develop alternative tools such as telephonic or Skype calls as much as possible the face to face interviews.

In parallel, the team will compile all necessary documents, review, process the data collected, analyse the data collected, conduct complementary / supplementary consultations in case of missing information and data.

The outputs of this phase will be:

- Results of the assessment in crude form (field notes, questionnaires)
- Processed data
- Preliminary findings
- Proceedings of the draft report and workshop.

## 5.1.1 Reporting

The report will be objective and independent; will use a clear and understandable language; will substantiate all findings and ensure they are verifiable; will double check data and sources and ensure they are correct and accurate; will acknowledge corrective measures already taken.

After the completion of Mission- I, the consultant will return home and will have 15 working days spread over 3 weeks to deliver the draft final report. The consultant will share draft report to national consultant for the input if any and a decent quality control will be done prior to submission to UNDP. The UNDP will provide comments within the next two weeks and the experts will have 15 days to finalise the report including carrying out the validation workshop. Once it is finalized, a validation workshop is planned during second mission.

A draft CRA Report including as per the ToR will have: an Executive Summary as a stand-alone document, an Introduction providing sufficient information on the methodological approach to convince the reader of the credibility of the assessment; the Main Text structured around the CRA standard such as a contextual overview, the national response to corruption, institutional capacity to fight corruption, policies and practices in public service, partnerships in the fight against corruption, etc.); the Conclusions and Recommendations and the required appendices.

At the Validation Workshop the Team will present the assessment methodology, the findings and conclusions. The stakeholders will be invited in a frank and open discussion to formulate comments, suggestions, provide further feedback and information. The intention is to reach at the end of the workshop some common understanding on the direction the assessment study will have to take. In order to allow such a discussion, it is suggested the workshop will last a full day.

Throughout the assignment, the two consultants will maintain communication regularly in order to exchange progress and for consultations. At the same time, the team will communicate to UNDP as and when required.

## 5.2 Work Plan

A tentative work plan is provided below:

CRA Activity	Time Frame	Activities	Output		
	Mission I				
Step 1: Stocktaking/Lit review	20 Nov- 10 Dec 2016 ( <b>20 days</b> )	<ol> <li>Series of focus group/round table discussions and key informant interviews (KII) with representatives of different sectors such as the academe, government, and civil society organizations.</li> <li>Review of related literature</li> </ol>	• A Report entailing a comprehensive corruption risk assessment, whose major section will be time-bound (immediate, medium and long term) and actor-specific recommendations on measures for promoting		
Step 2: Policy and institutional analysis	20 Nov-10 Dec 2016	Analysis and clustering of data gathered during stocktaking based on trends and relevant policies/institutions	integrity and mitigating corruption risks		
Step 3: Corruption Risk Assessment Survey	20 Nov-10 Dec 2016	<ul> <li>Expert discussions and consultations to develop the following:</li> <li>Identify risk</li> <li>Assess impact and likelihood based on the risk criteria developed</li> <li>Prioritization of risks</li> <li>Measures to address risks</li> </ul>			
Step 4:	11 Dec – 30	Analysis and preparation of CRA			
CRA report	Dec 2016	report			
preparation	(15 days)				
		Mission II			
Step 5: Presentation and validation of CRA	7 <sup>th</sup> Jan 2017- 20 <sup>th</sup> Jan 2017 ( <b>10 days</b> )	<ul><li> Presentation of the draft assessment report of corruption risks.</li><li> Validation of CRA findings.</li></ul>	CRA validation		
Step 6: Working sessions	7 <sup>th</sup> Jan 2017- 20 <sup>th</sup> Jan 2017	• Working sessions with the person who will take on the second phase of applying the recommendations to the REDD+ context in order to pass on all relevant information			
Step 7: Collection of missing information for recommendations	7 <sup>th</sup> Jan 2017- 20 <sup>th</sup> Jan 2017	• Second phase discussions for recommendations. (Time permitting)			
Step 8: Final report recommendations	1 Feb 2017- 28 <sup>th</sup> 2017 (15 days)	Expert discussions and consultations to develop a preliminary budget and identify responsibilities for the implementation of corruption risk mitigation measures, and to extract lessons that may be applicable in other countries	• A capacity development plan for relevant and interested civil society groups and media, with specific and measurable indicators		

Refinements and incorporation of comments if any		• Final Report - A capacity development plan for relevant and interested civil society groups and media, with specific and measurable indicators
Total	60 days	

## **APPENDICES**

## **Appendix 1: Documents to Review**

- 1. Background documentation,
  - National regulatory framework for public procurement with focus on integrity related issues and conflicting.
  - Anti-corruption legislation.
  - International regulatory framework -, in particular the UNCAC and national regulatory framework in particular the Account Act (comptabilitieits wet), Law on principles of State land policy (L-decreet 1982), Mining law (Mijnbouw wet 1986), Law on Forest Management (Wet Bosbeheer 1992), Law on transiting of goods (wet goederenverkeer 2003) and the Regulations regarding Procurement of Works (Aanbestedingsreglement voor Werken 1996).
  - Law on Mineral Exploration and Extraction Near Water Sources, Protected Areas and Forests
- 2. Existing institutional framework.
- 3. The National REDD+ Strategy.
- 4. Readiness Preparation Proposals (R-PPs).
- 5. REDD+ stakeholder engagement strategy documents.
- 6. REDD+ Corruption Risk Assessment.
  - Transparency, accountability and inclusiveness of key forest governance processes and institutions
  - Corruption under REDD cases.
- 7. Multi-perspective analysis of drivers of deforestation, forest degradation and barriers to REDD+ activities.

## **Appendix 2: Questionnaire**

#### Section 1: General

- 1. How satisfied with the overall situation of Suriname?
  - a. Very satisfied
  - b. Somewhat satisfied
  - c. Somewhat dissatisfied
  - d. Very dissatisfied
- 2. What do you think are currently the biggest problems for Suriname?
  - a. Good governance
  - b. Political stability
  - c. Security
  - d. Corruption
  - e. Unemployment
  - f. Rule of law
  - g. Poverty
  - h. Crime
  - i. Other economic issues
  - j. Other (specify
- 3. How serious is the problem of corruption (that is, the abuse of official position for private gain) in Suriname?
  - a. Very serious
  - b. Somewhat serious
  - c. Not very serious
  - d. Not serious at all
- 4. How would you compare the level of corruption versus past years?
  - a. Much higher
  - b. Somewhat higher
  - c. About the same
  - d. Somewhat lower
  - e. Much lower
  - f. Don't know
- 5. What is the reason behind corruption in Suriname?
  - a. No rule of law
  - b. Longstanding cultural factors (tradition).
  - c. The opening of markets and liberalization.
  - d. The absence of mechanism that can make people prosper in an honest and transparent manner.
  - e. The absence of adequate salaries for officials in government.
  - f. The absence of sufficient sanctions, especially in the form of effective and enforced criminal prosecution.
- 6. Which government institution is perceived as most corrupt?
  - a. Parliament
  - b. Government
  - c. Ministries

- d. Law enforcement agencies
- e. Prosecutor's office
- f. Other
- 7. What is the level of corruption in government institutions?
  - a. Very corrupt
  - b. Somewhat corrupt
  - c. Not all corrupt or rarely
  - d. Don't know
- 8. What do you think are factors causing corruption in Suriname?
  - a. Low salary
  - b. Ambition to become rich
  - c. No ethics or morals
  - d. Don't know
- 9. Whenever officials are contacted, the following happened:
  - a. Do not demand directly but expected a cash gift/favor.
  - b. Demand cash gift or favor
  - c. Use personal connections to get preferential treatment
  - d. Give cash to official
  - e. Give gift to official
- 10. What are the motives behind corruption?
  - a. There is no other way to get things done
  - b. To speed up the process/procedures
  - c. to get license and permits
  - d. To avoid sanctions or punishment
  - e. To avoid higher official payments
- 11. What are the consequences of corruption?
  - a. Violation of law
  - b. Arrest and prosecution
  - c. Ambiguous laws and regulations
  - d. Poor enforcement of the rule of law
  - e. The overall culture of governance
- 12. What type of corruption have you heard of?
  - a. Bribe
  - b. Fraud
  - c. Institutional corruption
  - d. Political corruption
  - e. Corporate corruption
  - f. Administrative corruption
  - g. Petty corruption
  - h. Systemic corruption
- 13. What is the main source of information in terms of providing accurate and reliable information concerning corruption in Suriname?
  - a. Press and media
  - b. The experiences of your own, friends, family and colleagues

- c. Non-governmental organizations in Suriname
- d. International sources (foreign TV broadcasts, books, the Internet, and information from donor organizations)
- e. Other
- 14. And how would you characterize the effectiveness of the Suriname government to date in reducing or controlling corruption in Suriname?
  - a. Very effective
  - b. Somewhat effective
  - c. Somewhat ineffective
  - d. Very ineffective
  - e. No efforts made by government
- 15. Is it easy of corruption reporting process?
  - a. Very easy
  - b. Somewhat easy
  - c. Somewhat hard
  - d. Very hard
  - e. Don't know
- 16. How would you characterize the will of the government to combat official corruption in Suriname?
  - a. The government is fully committed to combating corruption
  - b. The government is mostly committed to combating corruption
  - c. Government officials are divided in their willingness to combat corruption
  - d. The government has little or no desire to combat corruption
- 17. Which of the following do you think is the biggest obstacle to combating corruption in Suriname?
  - a. The government is not fully committed to combating corruption
  - b. Entrenched political elites see little benefit in combating corruption
  - c. Entrenched business elites see little benefit in combating corruption
  - d. Public accepts corruption as a fact of life
  - e. Other
- 18. Of the following tactics to prevent/reduce corruption, which do you think would be the most effective approach?
  - a. To promote discussion on international treaties and compliances and the highest level of the government of Suriname.
  - b. To promote discussion at the "grassroots" level in Suriname.
  - c. To give senior level in government and civil society greater access to international conferences, discussions.
  - d. To enforce existing laws and regulations fully.
  - e. To reform existing laws and regulations for compliance with international norms.
- 19. In general, do government institutions operate under well-recognized rules and procedures, and are they professional and effective in getting their work done?
  - a. Very much so
  - b. Somewhat
  - c. Not at all
- 20. Do you agree CSOs are capable of combating corruption?
  - a. Strongly agree
  - b. Somewhat agree

- c. Somewhat disagree
- d. Strongly disagree
- 21. Do you agree or disagree that as a reporter of corruption, they feel (one who reports) protected from potential harassment?
  - a. Strongly agree
  - b. Somewhat agree
  - c. Somewhat disagree
  - d. Strongly disagree
- 22. Would the following actions be considered corruption in Suriname?
  - a. Using a public position to collect gifts, money
  - b. Using a public position to help friends, relatives (such as giving jobs or licenses, or favoring in bids)
  - c. Distributing gifts, money in election campaign
  - d. Presenting money to civil servants to obtain public services.
- 23. What is the main resource used in this country's corruption?
  - a. Personal control of state power at the top
  - b. Contending networks loyal to powerful officials and businesspeople
  - c. A tight ring of political, bureaucratic, and business elites
  - d. Wealth, used to influence politicians and decision makers
- 24. Have you ever heard of corruption scandals/cases?
  - a. Cases with involvement of high-level public officials
  - b. Cases with strong political interest
  - c. Cases where big local and foreign businesses are involved
  - d. Cases causing high-level damage to the country
  - e. Cases in which bribe amounts are substantial
  - f. Cases in which organized crime is involved
- 25. How would you describe corrupt dealings, most of the time?
  - a. Unpredictable and disruptive
  - b. Moderately predictable and not disruptive
  - c. Highly predictable and falling into widely known patterns
- 26. Generally speaking, how would you describe the opposition to corruption?
  - a. Weak and disorganized
  - b. Moderate to strong
  - c. Weak to moderate
  - d. Weak, risky, and intimidated

#### 27. How do you see the performance of Suriname in fighting corruption?

- a. Very good
- b. Good
- c. Not good
- d. Bad
- e. Very bad
- 28. According to your direct or indirect experience, who is more likely ask money to get their assistance?
  - a. Local authorities
  - b. Public officials ministry/departments

- c. Customs officials
- d. Law enforcement officials
- e. Tax/revenues officials
- f. Others
- 29. To what extent do you think corruption can be reduced in Suriname?
  - a. Corruption cannot be reduced at all
  - b. Corruption can be reduced to a certain degree
  - c. Corruption can be substantially reduced
  - d. Corruption can be completely eradicated
- 30. Are you aware of any anti-corruption measures being taken by the Government of Suriname?
  - a. Yes
  - b. No
- 31. How effective or ineffective is the Government's fight against corruption in Suriname?
  - a. Very effective
  - b. Somehow effective
  - c. Not very effective
  - d. Don't know

#### Section 1: REDD+

- 32. Please tell me, in your opinion, how honest / dishonest REDD+ related institutions?
  - a. Very honest,
  - b. Fairly honest,
  - c. Slightly dishonest
  - d. Very dishonest
- 33. Does the REDD+ strategy include clear rules on transparency, such as disclosure policies?
  - a. Yes
  - b. No
- 34. Does the REDD+ strategy assign clear authority for the use of funds
  - a. Yes
  - b. No
- 35. Are there asset disclosure and conflict of interest policies and practices in REDD+ in Suriname?
  - a. Yes
  - b. No
- 36. Do public service performance management systems (including transparency and accountability as part of performance criteria) exist in governmental bodies in charge of REDD+? Are they effectively applied?
  - a. Yes
  - b. No
- 37. Does Suriname have a freedom of information law or act? Are there other government policies that support free and timely stakeholder access to information about the REDD+ program, including information on rights to lands, trees and resources?
  - a. Yes

- b. No
- 1. Are there specific plans to develop the capacities of civil society and indigenous people to engage in anti-corruption for REDD+?
  - a. Yes
  - b. No
- 38. Does the REDD+ strategy include clear rules on transparency, such as disclosure policies, active dissemination through multiple and appropriate channels and clear rules on when and how often information will be made public?
  - a. Yes
  - b. No
- 39. Is there a specific plan to encourage citizens to demand information on public undertakings relevant to REDD+, such as budgets, expenditures, employment opportunities, procurements, etc.?
  - a. Yes
  - b. No
- 40. Are the procurement policies and legal and regulatory frameworks compatible with the overall national legal system and when appropriate with international norms and standards?
  - a. Yes
  - b. No

#### **Section 2: Forestry Sector**

- 41. Are you aware of corruption risk in forestry sector in Suriname?
  - a. Yes
  - b. No
  - c. Do not know
- 42. Is there licensing, permits and procurement regulations?
  - a. Yes
  - b. No
  - c. Do not know
- 43. Is there a whistle blowing channel in case one detects corruption in forestry sector?
  - a. Yes
  - b. No
  - c. Do not know

#### 44. Are staff/ customers have been warned on corrupt practices?

- d. Yes
- e. No
- f. Do not know
- 45. Are staff have been trained on integrity?
  - a. Yes

- b. No
- c. Do not know

46. How would you rate the level of corruption in forestry sector today in Suriname?

- a. Very high
- b. Moderate
- c. Low
- d. Don't know
- 47. When rating the level of corruption in forestry sector, what do you base your assessment on?
  - a. Personal experience
  - b. Discussions with others [e.g. colleagues etc.
  - c. Information from the institution
  - d. Information from the media
  - e. Information from Ethics and Anti Corruption
  - f. Information from politicians
  - g. information from a place of worship
  - h. Other(Specify)

48. Compared to one year ago, how has the level of corruption changed in forestry sector?

- a. Increased
- b. Reduced
- c. Remained the same
- d. Don't Know
- 49. In your own assessment, how widespread is corruption among the employees of forestry sector?
  - a. Almost all officials are involved in it
  - b. Most officials are involved in it
  - c. Only a few officials are involved in it
  - d. Hardly any officials are involved in it
  - e. Don't Know/Not Applicable
- 50. Is any Pressure exerted to engage in corrupt practice in forestry sector?
  - a. Yes
  - b. No
- 51. How is the legal, social and administrative factors that impact on corruption in forestry sector?
  - a. High
  - b. Weak
  - c. Low
  - d. Controlled
- 52. Do relevant authorities give public notice of proposed forest policies, programs, laws, and projects?
  - a. The authorities give clear, timely notice of all proposed policies, programs, laws, and projects.
  - b. The authorities give clear, timely notice of most proposed policies, programs, laws, and projects.

- c. The authorities give clear, timely notice of less than half of its proposed policies, programs, laws, and projects.
- d. The authorities seldom or never give clear, timely notice of proposed policies, programs, laws, and projects.
- 53. Are commercial timber forest products allocations from public forests open and transparent?
  - a. Details of allocation systems are always open and transparent.
  - b. Details of allocation systems are sometimes open and transparent.
  - c. Details of allocation systems are rarely open and transparent.
  - d. Details of allocation systems are never open and transparent.
- 54. Are concession and sale allocation processes transparent and free of corruption?
  - a. Concession and sale allocation processes are transparent and free of corruption.
  - b. Some concession and sale allocation processes are non-transparent or corrupt.
  - c. All or almost all concession and sale allocation processes are non-transparent or corrupt.
- 55. How is the institutional capacity in forestry sector in addressing corruption risks?
  - a. Low
  - b. High
  - c. Hierarchical
  - d. Centralized
- 56. What are the factors contributing to corruption in forestry sector?
  - a. Weaknesses in current forest laws.
  - b. Inappropriate forest land classification.
  - c. Lack of transparency and accountability in timber allocation policies.
  - d. Absence of an effective forest management planning and regulatory framework.
  - e. Protection of powerful interests.
  - f. Absence or failure to involve local communities in decision making about forest land use policies
- 57. How do you see current rules, regulations, permits and authorizations., penalty systems and enforcement capacity in forestry sector in Suriname?
  - a. High
  - b. Weak
  - c. Low
  - d. Controlled
- 58. Are there avenues for stakeholders to report issues of concern about the agency and its management of the forests?
  - a. All stakeholders can easily raise issues in avenues where they can be attended to (with field offices, forest officials, government authorities outside the forest department, and ombudsmen).
  - b. Most stakeholders can easily raise issues in avenues where they can be attended to (with field offices, forest officials, government authorities outside the forest department, and ombudsmen).
  - c. Some stakeholders can easily raise issues in avenues where they can be attended to (with field offices, forest officials, government authorities outside the forest department, and ombudsmen).
  - d. Most stakeholders cannot raise issues where they can be attended to.

#### Section 3: Mining Sector

59. Is there a clear legal definition for ownership of mineral rights? If so, they are:

- a. Transparent
- b. Discretionary
- c. Accountable
- 60. Does the mining department or relevant body, have a mission statement / guiding vision / policy statement on mineral resource allocations? If so, they are:
  - a. Transparent
  - b. Discretionary
  - c. Accountable
- 61. Are mining licences transferable at all times, or are there restrictions? If so, they are:
  - a. Transparent
  - b. Discretionary
  - c. Accountable
- 62. Are State-Owned Companies (SOC's) active in the following mining sector activities?
  - a. Exploration
  - b. Operations / Production
  - c. Equity Partner
- 63. How law treats foreign and local companies in mining sector licencing?
  - a. Transparent
  - b. Discretionary
  - c. Accountable
- 64. Does more than one level of government issues mining sector licences? If yes, how do you see the legal process?
  - a. Transparent
  - b. Discretionary
  - c. Accountable
- 65. How is the legal framework before granting of exploration licences?
  - a. Transparent
  - b. Discretionary
  - c. Accountable
- 66. Is there a system for appeals against decisions by the authority in charge of awarding exploration licences?
  - a. Transparent
  - b. Discretionary
  - c. Accountable

#### **Section 4: Civil Society**

- 67. How would you characterize the effectiveness of civil societies in preventing corruption in Suriname?
  - a. Very effective
  - b. Somewhat effective
  - c. Somewhat ineffective
  - d. Very ineffective
  - e. No efforts made by civil societies
- 68. How do you see the role of civil society in fighting corruption in Suriname?
  - a. Very effective
  - b. Somewhat effective
  - c. Somewhat ineffective
  - d. Very ineffective
  - e. No efforts made by civil societies
- 69. For what reasons, would one not report corruption
  - a. Reporters will be subject to retribution/retaliation
  - b. No action will be taken
  - c. Not worth reporting if it doesn't affect me
  - d. Most corrupt acts result from economic hardship
  - e. Society doesn't reward reporting
  - f. No whistle-blower protection
  - g. Lack of evidence to prove
  - h. Lack of clarity about corruption proceedings
  - i. Don't know relevant institution to report to
- 70. Do you agree that citizens should be responsible for reducing corruption?
  - a. Agree
  - b. Somewhat agree
  - c. Somewhat disagree
  - d. Disagree
- 71. What should be done to prevent corruption?
  - a. Perfect legislation strong and new anti-corruption law
  - b. Transparency in administrative decision making
  - c. Strengthening civil society for building awareness
- 72. Is there a negative impact on you and your family?
  - a. We cannot secure public services smoothly
  - b. Obstacles in business and private activities because of bureaucracy, inequality
  - c. It affects the standard of living
  - d. Price increases
  - e. It has an impact on environment and health,
  - f. Don't Know/ No Answer
- 73. Who should lead the effort to combat corruption?
  - a. Government
  - b. Civil society
  - c. Courts
  - d. Law enforcement
  - e. All of the above

- 74. Do you find reports about corruption in the media you use (radio, TV, newspapers)?
  - a. Yes, very often
  - b. Yes, sometimes
  - c. Rarely
  - d. No

#### **Section 5: Private Sector**

- 75. According to your direct or indirect experience, which of the area is most common for corruption to get their assistance?
  - a. Goods at customs
  - b. Environment/health services
  - c. Business licences
  - d. Public procurement of goods/services
  - e. Residence and work permits
  - f. Vehicle registrations
  - g. Contact with the court
  - h. Private procurement of goods/services
- 76. Are there certain population groups more at risk of being victim of corruption (i.e. vulnerable groups)?
  - a. Business people
  - b. Ordinary consumers
  - c. Ordinary citizens
  - d. Low income groups
  - e. Other
- 77. Has the level of corruption changed over time (last two years)?
  - a. Increased
  - b. Decreased
  - c. No change
  - d. No idea

## Appendix 3: Potential Organizations and Agencies for Data Collection

## 1. The Government of the Republic of Suriname

- Ministry of Justice and Police
- Ministry of Education
- Ministry of Finance
- Ministry of Justice and Police
- Ministry of Natural Resources
- Ministry of Public Works
- Other Ministries
- Public Prosecutor
- Office of the Registrar of the Court of Justice
- Ministry of Labour
- Ministry of Regional Development
- The National Assembly
- Parliamentarians
- The Supreme Audit Institution
- Election office
- Bureau of Public Health
- General Bureau of Statistics
- Central Bank of Suriname
- Anti Corruption Agency (if any)
- Tax Office
- Customs office
- Police Department
- The District Councils
- The Local Councils

## 2. Representatives of Civil Society and Private Sector

- Bar Association
- Chamber of Commerce
- National Women's Movement
- Suriname Trade and Industry Association (VSB)
- University of Suriname
- Political Parties
- 3. International Organizations and Community
  - Regional organizations e.g. IDB
  - The World Bank
  - UN agencies
  - European Union (if available)

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